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I. Introduction
For the past few years, the European Union (“EU”) has been
grappling with an influx of immigrants, particularly Syrian
refugees.1 From the United Kingdom2 to Sweden to the Czech

† J.D. Candidate 2019, University of North Carolina School of Law. The author would
like to thank the North Carolina Journal of International Law editors and staff members
for their hard work in making this publication a reality.
1 See Reuters, Immigrant population hits new high in Germany, REUTERS (Aug. 1,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-immigration/immigrant-populationhits-new-high-in-germany-idUSKBN1AH3EP [https://perma.cc/Y5D5-9RUS].
2 For the purposes of this Note, assume the United Kingdom is still within the EU.
As of this writing, Brexit has not yet occurred. See Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit:
All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (July 31, 2018),
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Republic, the influx has become an increasingly prevalent political
issue.3 However, this is not a new issue for the EU.4 Since 1999,
the EU has attempted to establish a set of uniform asylum rules for
its member states with the establishment of the Common European
Asylum System (“CEAS”).5 In furtherance of this objective, the EU
proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union (“the Charter”), which would establish the overall framework
of the legislation.6
This Note will examine a recent European Court of Justice case,
K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie,7 and its
interpretation of the Charter’s relation to EU law and policy. First,
it will delve into a brief background of the CEAS and the facts of
the case. Second, it will explore the applicable European laws and
their current applications. Third, it will analyze how the European
Court of Justice has imposed another limitation on the exercise of a
third-party national’s right to liberty under the Charter, while
striking a proper balance between state and applicant interests.
Finally, this Note will look to the likely future consequences of the
ruling, and the potential fallout had the European Court of Justice

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 [https://perma.cc/8YG2-AYXR].
3 See Johan Ahlander & Mansoor Yosufzai, Sweden intensifies crackdown on illegal
immigrants, REUTERS (July 13, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swedenimmigration-crackdown/sweden-intensifies-crackdown-on-illegal-immigrantsidUSKBN19Y0G8 [https://perma.cc/M44U-HY7D]; REUTERS, Britons want to see
immigration
controlled:
PM
May,
REUTERS
(Sept.
6,
2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-immigration-may/britons-want-to-seeimmigration-controlled-pm-may-idUSKCN1BH1K7
[https://perma.cc/4BLF-4F5C];
Nikodem Chinowski, Beyond Borders: Immigration Within the EU, EMERGING EUROPE
(Oct. 8, 2017), http://emerging-europe.com/interviews/beyond-borders-immigrationwithin-eu/ [https://perma.cc/LNN4-EVBL].
4 Anthony Faiola, A global surge in refugees leaves Europe struggling to cope,
WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/newmigration-crisis-overwhelms-european-refugee-system/2015/04/21/3ab83470-e45c11e4-ae0f-f8c46aa8c3a4_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.75406ad30907
[https://perma.cc/4J3V-GMGN].
5 CÉLINE BAULOZ, MELTEM INELI-CIGER, & SARAH SINGER, SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: SELECTED PROTECTION ISSUES RAISED BY THE SECOND PHASE OF THE
COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM 34 (2015).
6 Lillian M. Langford, The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations under the Common
European Asylum System and the Unraveling of EU Solidarity, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
217, 229–30 (2013).
7 K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, Case C-18/16, [2017] E.C.J.1
(CELEX No. 616CJ0018) [hereinafter K Case].
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ruled in the alternative.
II. K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie
A. General Overview
K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie arises from a
detention action brought in a District Court of the Hague,
Netherlands.8 Mr. K and the Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en
Justitie (State Secretary for Security and Justice, Netherlands)
referred the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union to
determine whether Mr. K’s detention under Directive 2013/33/EU
was valid under Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 9
The European Court of Justice has jurisdiction over the issue, as it
is a question of interpreting EU law and the potential annulment of
a EU legal act.10
In late November 2015, Mr. K boarded a plane in Vienna,
Austria, bound for Amsterdam, Netherlands.11
However,
Amsterdam was merely a connection point for Mr. K.12 His
eventual destination was Edinburgh, United Kingdom.13 During
boarding procedures for the Edinburgh flight, Mr. K was suspected
of using a fake passport, then subsequently detained and charged in
a Dutch criminal court.14
It was determined that Mr. K was not a Dutch citizen, nor was
he a citizen of any European Union member state.15 After the
criminal action was dismissed and Mr. K released, he applied for
asylum in the Netherlands.16 The Dutch authorities then detained K
once again, stating they needed to determine his actual identity and

See id.
Id. ¶ 1–2, 23; See Council Directive 2013/33, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 96 (EU)
[hereinafter Directive 2013/33/EU]; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, art. 6, Oct. 26, 2012 (C 326/391) [hereinafter Charter].
10 What does the CJEU do?, European Union (last visited Nov. 17, 2017),
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en
[https://perma.cc/EPY4-A7A9].
11 K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 17.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. ¶ 18–19.
15 See id. ¶ 17.
16 Id. ¶ 20.
8
9
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that K was a flight risk.17 Consequently, Mr. K challenged his
detention, arguing it violated Article 6 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights.18
B. Common European Asylum System
It is necessary to explain the European Union asylum process,
as this case hinges on the interpretation of its purpose and
application.19 In 1999, at a meeting in Tampere, Finland, the
European Council decided to create a broad-sweeping uniform
scheme on asylum in its member states.20 The objective was to
“reconcil[e] the universal interests of asylum seekers as stated in EU
policy documents with the particular interest of the EU or its
Member States.”21
To this end, the prevailing principle was to ensure “nobody is
sent back to persecution,” otherwise known as the principle of nonrefoulement.22
The system was meant to provide clear
determinations for which Member State was responsible for the
application, the common procedures that would be followed,
minimum conditions of retainer, and rules on refugee status.23
In addition, the Council took a stance that “third-party
nationals,” like Mr. K, must be granted fair treatment, especially in
the face of racism and xenophobia.24 To this end, the Council called
for “[a] more vigorous integration policy . . . granting [third-party
nationals] rights and obligations comparable to those of EU
citizens.”25 For Member States, the Council instructed that any
decisions made must factor in each State’s capacity for asylum
seekers and the relationship of that State to the applicant’s country
of origin.26

K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 23.
19 See id. ¶ 32
20 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council (Oct. 15-16, 1999)
[hereinafter Presidency Conclusions] [https://perma.cc/DH32-98AX]; see BAULOZ, supra
note 5, at 35.
21 BAULOZ, supra note 5, at 35.
22 Presidency Conclusions, supra note 20.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
17
18
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However, in the past 18 years, CEAS has never truly come to
fruition.27 Instead, a series of directives and regulations have
established the general framework that governs asylum applicant
rights.28
III. European Asylum Law
A. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, or the European Convention on Human
Rights (“ECHR” or “the Convention”), is the overarching
agreement in the European Union for the protection of human
rights, including the rights of asylum seekers.29 All Member States
of the EU are required to accede to the Convention, and the EU
itself, as an entity, was required to become a party under the 2009
Treaty of Lisbon.30 In addition to enumerating the rights and
freedoms under the EU, the Convention also establishes the
European Court of Human Rights.31 Under Article 34 of the ECHR,
access to the Court of Human Rights extends to “any person . . .
claiming to be the victim of a [human rights] violation by one of the
High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention.”32
Furthermore, any ruling by the Court of Human Rights will be
binding on the parties, thus ensuring these rights are properly
respected.33
Of those rights, perhaps one of the most important is the Right
to Liberty and Security, as enumerated in Article 5.34 Under this
Article, every person not only has a right to be informed of the
27 See Ulrich Becker & Julia Hagn, Reform of the European Asylum System: Why
Common Social Standards are Imperative, 14 J. FOR INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS, at 21–
26 (2016).
28 Id.
29 Thus, the name. See Langford, supra note 6, at 227.
30 Id. at 227.
31 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, § II,
June 1, 2010, C.E.T.S. 194 [hereinafter ECHR]; see Langford, supra note 6, at 22.
32 ECHR, supra note 31, § II, art. 34.
33 Court
in
Brief,
EUR.
CT.
FOR
HUM.
RTS.,
www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court&c= (last visited Nov. 17, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/CYW2-8NH4].
34 ECHR, supra note 31, § I, art. 5.
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reasons for his or her detention, but also has the right to be free from
any detention.35 However, there are six exceptions to this right.36
These exceptions are for lawful detentions: (1) after conviction, (2)
for non-compliance with a court order, (3) to be brought before a
court on reasonable suspicion, (4) of a minor for educational
supervision, (5) for quarantine, and (6) those in deportation or
extradition actions.37 Thus, it is only when exercising proper law
enforcement functions that a Member State may detain one of its
own citizens, a citizen of another Member State, or a third-party
national.38
B. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
A year after the ECHR, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union (“the Charter”) was announced in Nice,
France.39 However, the Charter lacked binding legal authority at the
time.40 This changed in 2009 at the Treaty of Lisbon, when the
Charter was changed to become the binding embodiment of the
ECHR.41 It is now part of EU primary-law and is enforceable in
every court and at all levels of the judicial system in the EU.42
The Charter is split into seven chapters: Dignity, Freedoms,
Equality, Solidarity, Citizens’ Rights, Justice, and General
Provisions.43 Notably, the Charter explicitly provides the right to
asylum and the right to liberty for all, including non-European
Union citizens and persons.44 Within the Freedoms Chapter, Article
18 provides, “[t]he right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due
respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 . . .
and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”45 Whereas,

Id. § I, art. 5.
Id. § I, art. 5.
37 Id. § I, art. 5. (1)(a)-(f).
38 See id. § I, art. 5.
39 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty
of Lisbon, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 645, 645–82 (2011).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Langford, supra note 6, at 229.
43 See Charter, supra note 9, O.J. (L 180) 96.
44 See id. at art. 5, 18; see Langford, supra note 6, at 230.
45 Charter, supra note 9, O.J. (L 180) 96, at art. 18.
35
36
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Article 6 provides “[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security
of person.”46
Article 52 of the Charter defines the scope of these rights. 47
Article 52(1) provides:
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms
recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the
principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they
are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest
recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights
and freedoms of others.48

Thus, each Member State, and the EU as an entity, must
acknowledge the rights within the Charter and only limit them in a
direct, legislative manner. Additionally, Article 52(3) explicitly
encompasses the ECHR:
Insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights
Guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of
those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing
more extensive protection.49

Given these three Articles, Articles 18, 6, and 52, European law
creates very broad rights for those that seek asylum within the
Union’s borders.50 Seekers have an express right to liberty, and that
right cannot be limited unless made by a very narrowly tailored
law.51 Furthermore, the EU has enacted certain directives and
regulations to provide guidance for Member States and asylum
seekers at each step of the way, as discussed below.52
C. The Four Pillars of Asylum53
EU asylum law—the Charter and the ECHR—sits on four

46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id., at art. 6 (emphasis added).
See id. at art. 52.
Id. at art. 52(1).
Id. at art. 52(3).
See id. at arts. 6, 18, 52.
See Charter, supra note 9, O.J. (L 180) 96, at art. 6, 18, 52.
See Becker, supra note 27, at 21.
See id.
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pillars, which have been modified and reformed over the years.54
These four pillars are the Qualification Directive, Asylum
Protections Directive, Reception Directive, and the Dublin III
Regulation.55
1. Qualification Directive
The Qualification Directive, Directive 2011/95/EU, was
enacted in 2011.56 Its objectives were “to establish standards for the
granting of international protection to third-country nationals and
stateless person[s], for a uniform status for refugees . . . and for the
content of the protection granted.”57 Consisting of 42 articles,
Directive 2011/95/EU notably enumerates the assessment criteria
for asylum applications.58 Article 4 states:
(1) [It is] the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible
all the elements needed to substantiate the application for
international protection . . .
(2) The elements . . . consist of the applicant’s statements and all
the documentation at the applicant’s disposal regarding the
applicant’s age, background, including that of relevant relatives,
identity, nationality(ies), country(ies) and place(s) of previous
residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, travel
documents and the reasons for applying for international
protection.59

Thus, Directive 2011/95/EU gives Member States a broad
outline of what is required in each asylum application.
Additionally, it places the onus on the applicant to provide this
information to the Member State, ensuring a cooperative process.
This is only the first step.60
2. Asylum Procedures Directive
The Asylum Procedures Directive, Directive 2013/32/EU,

See id.
See id. at 21–22.
56 See id.
57 Directive 2011/95/EU of The European Parliament and of The Council, 2011 O.J.
(L 337) 9, ¶ 49 (EU) [hereinafter Directive 2011/95/EU].
58 Id. at art. 4.
59 Id.
60 See Becker, supra note 27, at 22.
54
55
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enumerates the process for granting or removing asylum.61 Notably,
it gives explicit definitions for “applicant,” “refugee,” and “remain
in member state.”62 Furthermore, in Article 9, the Directive
explicitly grants: “[a]pplicants shall be allowed to remain in the
Member State, for the sole purpose of the procedure, until the
determining authority has made a decision.”63 Thus, an applicant
knows they at least have temporary protection within the Member
State. Member States also know their duty to the applicant while
they determine the final decision on the asylum application.64
Again, this emphasizes a cooperative process actively involving the
applicant in each step along the way.65
3. Reception Directive
The Reception Directive, Directive 2013/33/EU, provides the
exact standards for the reception of asylum applicants.66 It allows
for the detention of applicants, but only for a set of specified
reasons.67 Principally, an applicant cannot be held simply because
he or she is an applicant.68 A State can only detain an applicant
when: (a) determining an applicant’s identity, (b) determining
application elements that could not be obtained outside of detention,
especially if there is a risk of flight, (c) determining an applicant’s
right to enter the territory of the State, (d) in the event of extradition
or intentional delay of the extradition process, (e) when national
security requires it, or (f) as another Member State requires for their
own application process.69 Thus, the Member State knows the
proper and adequate process it can use.70 This both adequately
protects the rights and interests of the applicant, while
simultaneously insuring the State’s own interest in the proper
processing of a valid application.71

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

See id. at 22.
Directive 2013/32, EU, supra note 9, at art. 2.
Id. at art. 9(1).
Id. at art. 10.
Id. at art. 13.
See Becker, supra note 27, at 22.
Directive 2013/33/EU, supra note 9, at art. 8(3).
Id. at art. 8(1).
Id. at art. 8(3)(a)-(f).
Id. at art. 8(1)-(3).
Id. at art. 8(1)-(3).
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4. Dublin III Regulation72
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, otherwise known as the Dublin
III Regulation, establishes which Member State is responsible for
processing an asylum application.73 The regulation both requires
the Member State to review any application made in their
territory—including the border or transit areas—and also to inform
the applicant of the criteria and provide a personal interview.74
From these four pillars, the Qualification Directive, the Asylum
Procedures Directive, the Reception Directive, and the Dublin III
Regulation, EU law clearly establishes a well detailed process for
asylum applications.75 Member States are informed of their duties
and the proper ways of processing the applications.76 Applicants are
informed of the necessary steps and information.77 While each
Member State may have some slight variance on the exact steps and
required information, the generalities are clearly enumerated.78 This
gives courts a solid foundation to build upon when determining the
proper outcome when an issue like Mr. K’s arises.79
IV. Striking the Balance
In the case at hand, K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en
Justitie, Mr. K challenged the legality of Directive 2013/33/EU
Article 8(3) in the light of the Charter’s Article 6.80 Simply put, Mr.
K is challenging the Reception Directive’s detention provision,
especially when no extradition proceedings are underway.81 He
argued that Article 6 of the Charter— “[e]veryone has the right to

72 The Dublin Regulation is contentious and thoroughly written about. However, as
it has no bearing on the case at hand, I will not be elaborating on it. For further information
on the Dublin Regulation, see SAMANTHA VELLUTI, REFORMING THE COMMON EUROPEAN
ASYLUM SYSTEM — LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OF THE
EUROPEAN COURTS (2013); Langford, supra note 6, at 264.
73 See Becker, supra note 27, at 22.
74 Commission Regulation 604/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31, arts. 3–4 [hereinafter
Regulation 604/2013/EU].
75 See Becker, supra note 27, at 21–22.
76 See Regulation 604/2013/EU, supra note 74, at art. 3.
77 See id. at art. 4.
78 See id. at art. 3–4.
79 See id. at art. 3–4.
80 K, supra note 7, ¶ 23.
81 Id. ¶ 33.
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liberty and security of person”82 —prohibits his detention in the
Netherlands. The Court of Justice held Article 8(3) fits within the
Charter, as it only allows detention in scenarios where the State
interest rests in the requirements of processing the application. 83
The court explicitly states, “[the] EU legislature struck a fair
balance between . . . the applicant’s right to liberty and . . . the
requirements relating to the identification of that applicant or of his
nationality, or to the determination of the elements on which his
application is based.”84
A. Applicant vs. State Interests
At its core, the case is determined by a balancing of interests.
Indeed, the Court of Justice explicitly recognizes “limitations on the
exercise of the right [to liberty enshrined in Article 6 of the Charter]
must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary.”85 Here, the Court
of Justice has imposed a limitation on an asylum seeker’s exercise
of the right to liberty, while striking a balance between the liberty
interest and the State’s interest in ensuring proper application
procedure.86
The most obvious liberty interest is Mr. K’s interest to be free
from detention. The court notes there is precedent for this.87 In
Nabil and Others v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights
held that “any deprivation of liberty [under the second limb of
Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR] will be justified only for as long as
deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress. If such
proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention
will cease to be permissible under Article 5(1)(f) [of the ECHR].”88
As noted above, this article of the European Convention on Human
Rights is encompassed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.89
However, the noted difference is that while Article 5 of the
Convention creates the specifics of the right to liberty and security,

82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Charter, supra note 9, at art. 6.
See K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 49.
See id. ¶ 49.
See id. ¶ 40.
See id.
See id. ¶ 27.
See K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 27; Nabil and Others v. Hungary, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R.

(2015).
89

See Douglas-Scott, supra note 39.
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including in extradition or deportation scenarios,90 Article 6 of the
Charter merely states, “everyone has the right to liberty and security
of person.”91
However, Article 52 of the Charter, provides that all rights in
the ECHR are within the scope of the Charter’s enumerated rights.92
Yet, the Court of Justice rejects expanding the Charter to include
5(1)(f), stating “The fundamental right to liberty guaranteed in
Article 6 of the Charter has the same meaning as in Article 5 of the
ECHR, although the latter does not form part of the EU acquis” and
“[t]he ‘ . . . limitations which may legitimately be imposed on the
exercise of the rights laid down in Article 6 of the Charter may not
exceed those permitted by the ECHR.”93 In doing so, they decline
to follow Nabil, and instead venture on their own balancing test of
the involved interests.94
For their analysis, the Court of Justice adheres to the view that
a person’s right to liberty should rarely be infringed upon.95
Accordingly, one may think the Court would hold that K’s
detention, absent a legal proceeding against him, would be a
violation of the Charter. However, while admitting there were no
extradition proceedings against K, the Court of Justice found the
Member State’s interest to be compelling enough to hold the
detention was lawful.96
To find such, the Court looked to the principle of
proportionality.97 This principle requires that State measures do not
“exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to
attain the legitimate objectives pursued.”98 Applying this principle
to Directive 2013/33/EU Article 8(3), the Court of Justice held the

ECHR, supra note 31, at §1, art. 5(f).
Charter, supra note 9, at art. 6.
92 See id. at art. 52.
93 See K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 49.
94 See id. ¶ 49–81.
95 See id. ¶ 57.
96 See id. ¶ 64, 91.
97 See id. ¶ 57.
98 Id. ¶ 57. A close American companion to this principle would perhaps be the
Supreme Court’s doctrine of strict scrutiny. Note the goal must be legitimate, and the
means must not exceed what is necessary to accomplish that goal, thus a narrow approach.
See Strict Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
90
91

2018

LIBERTY'S APPLICATION

13

legitimate State objective was the proper functioning of the CEAS.99
The measure to achieve this objective—the detention—is grave,
however Article 9(1) of the Directive limits the adverse effects on
Mr. K.100 The Article states “[a]n applicant shall be detained only
for as short a period as possible and shall be kept in detention only
for as long as the grounds set out in Article 8(3) are applicable.”101
Thus, Mr. K could only be held by the Netherlands for as long as it
took ensure its asylum process was proceeding properly.102 Once it
was determined that Mr. K was who he said he was, he would have
to be released or extradited.103
Here, where Mr. K was held only as long as necessary to
ascertain his identity for the asylum process, the State’s detention
powers have been properly checked.104 While his right to liberty has
been severely diminished, it was both for a legitimate reason—the
asylum he requested—and for a limited time—the time needed to
ascertain his true identity, rather than the fake one he provided at
the airport. Thus, the Court of Justice struck the proper balance
between the two interests.105 It is true that Mr. K could be held
longer, but not without good cause (such as a lawful detention for
extradition). Furthermore, the Netherlands has been checked, but
without being limited in function. Mr. K may be unhappy, but it
appears that justice was properly administrated.
B. Likely Consequences
While the Court of Justice struck a reasonable balance between
the two conflicting interests, there are still some potential farreaching consequences.106 The most notable consequence is the
disregard of the ECHR’s specifics and Article 52 of the Charter.107
See K, supra note 7, ¶ 54–59.
See id. ¶ 57.
101 Directive 2013/33/EU, supra note 9, at art. 9(1).
102 See id. at art. 9(1).
103 See K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 73.
104 See id. ¶ 72–73.
105 See id. ¶ 87.
106 See Bernard Andonian, The difficulty of refusing protection to an EU national,
Gulbenkin Andonian (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.gulbenkian.co.uk/the-difficulty-ofrefusing-protection-to-an-eu-national/ [https://perma.cc/BL4J-75SN].
107 See Rights of Residence, The UK Law Societies’ Joint Brussels Office, (May 31,
2018),
http://www.lawsocieties.eu/news/may-case-law-digest/5065128.fullarticle.
[https://perma.cc/3K7H-JL5U].
99

100
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Article 52(3) explicitly states,
Insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing
more extensive protection. (emphasis added)108

This creates two issues. First, this sets a precedent of ignoring
the ECHR. While the Court of Justice is correct in noting the ECHR
is not a legally binding document for the EU,109 it still provides the
basic framework for the protections of human rights in the European
Union. The ECHR is essentially a “Bill of Rights” for the EU.110
To disregard the protections mentioned within—particularly those
related to extradition and deportation—is to disregard basic rights
that are demanded for citizens and third-party nationals. There is a
potential for hypocrisy, with the courts saying the rights must be
protected, and simultaneously ignoring the enumerated specifics of
those rights.
In this case, where there were no extradition proceedings in the
works,111 the protections of ECHR’s Article 5, as encompassed in
the Charter’s Article 6, would grant Mr. K a solid, valid claim. Why
should he be detained if the detention is not for one of the specified
purposes? Based on European asylum law, he should not.112
Admittedly, Mr. K. is in this predicament because of his own
actions (fake passport and applying for asylum),113 but the denial of
his right to liberty sets a dangerous precedent for other asylum
seekers. This precedent could even be viewed as catastrophic as
Europe struggles to answer its refugee crisis, particularly in less
forgiving nations, or those where public opinion has swung against
immigrants.114 Asylum seekers could potentially be detained for a
“limited time as necessary,” but with no guarantees that said limited
time is indeed limited. Nor is there a guarantee that those seeking
asylum will regain their freedom in a territory in which they wish to
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Charter, supra note 9, at art. 43, ¶ 3.
K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 32.
Douglas-Scott, supra note 37, at 655.
K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 27.
See ECHR, supra note 31, at § I, art. 5.
K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 18-19.
See Becker, supra note 27, at 21.
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reside, travel, or be protected. Even worse, the “applicable
grounds” could change. This is not to suggest the Member States
of the European Union are a set of dystopic police states, focused
on indefinitely detaining third-party nationals.115 Yet, if the original
grounds were for asylum verification, then changed to extradition
purposes, and then changed to a criminal context, the one who was
originally seeking protection could very well be detained for an
unreasonable time period.116
On the other hand, the Member State does have the legitimate
objective of ensuring those they grant asylum to are who they say
they are.117 This not only protects their citizens, but also ensures
proper assessment of the application. Thus, the State is juggling the
dual interests of their citizens’ protection and the speedy conclusion
of the asylum process.118 Without detention, these interests may
never be truly satisfied. Detention grants the State a kind of
insurance against any potential “dangerous activity”119 of the
asylum seeker, and the knowledge of the seeker’s location, allowing
for quick verification of information during the asylum process.120
The second issue with disregarding the ECHR and Article 52 of
the Charter arises from the last sentence of Article 52. This sentence
grants Member States the ability to increase the level of protection
for asylum seekers.121 Thus, the Netherlands could always enact
laws to give Mr. K further protections while applying for asylum.
Perhaps, give him further legal rights or changes in the level of
detention.
However, with the Court of Justice’s ruling, there is no incentive
to even codify the ECHR’s provisions at the national level.122 If
Member States are aware that courts will not look to the ECHR or
Article 52 of the Charter when making determinations on the scope
115 Besides the mild irony of an American writing in the current tense atmosphere
involving police actions (or lack thereof) in the US, it obviously would be impractical to
detain that many people indefinitely.
116 See Directive 2013/33/EU, supra note 9, at art. 9(1).
117 I believe Americans would call this a “national security concern.”
118 See Becker, supra note 27, at 21.
119 If unclear, the author is being intentionally skeptical.
120 See Emily Papp, Comment, Just Take My Word For It: Creating a Workable Test
to Ensure Reliability in Overseas Document Verification Reports for Asylum Proceedings,
101 IOWA L. REV. 2144, (2016).
121 See Charter, supra note 9, at art. 52(7).
122 See id.
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of these rights, but will rather attempt to interpret or expand other
Charter articles, it follows that they would push litigation to create
a scope that favors state interests.123 Yet, as structured as the EU is,
this piecemeal litigation may prove to only muddle the rights.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie
creates a reasonable balancing of liberty and State interests, but may
have adverse consequences on the clarity of rights in the EU. The
balancing of Mr. K’s right to liberty with the necessity of properly
assessing his application for asylum is objectively reasonable. Not
only does the Court of Justice afford great deference to the right, it
also ensures Member State power is checked. It realizes how
important the right is, and makes sure the detention is both based in
good cause and has a temporal limit.
However, by disregarding the scope of the right based on the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, the Court
of Justice has opened a door that may allow the enumerated rights
to be curtailed. It may become necessary for the Court of Justice to
reaffirm that the Charter on Fundamental Rights encompasses the
entire ECHR.
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